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ABSTRACT
Against Theory-Theory and Simulation-Theory approaches to social cognition,
Shaun Gallagher has advanced a phenomenologically and hermeneutically
sophisticated alternative he calls “Direct Perception.” Gallagher argues that we
require neither inferential nor analogical access to others’ mindedness, since that
mindedness is available to us directly in their expressive, interactive, and
intentional involvement in a shared situation. Starting with expression and
intentional interactions that unfold in the spaces between us, Direct Perception
promises greater descriptive adequacy and substantial leverage into the problem
of other minds than its competitors can offer.
Direct perception has many features that are appealing from a feminist
perspective: it treats persons as fundamentally social, contextual, interactive, and
embodied, while giving reasonable and appropriate attention to developmental
psychology. In doing so, it helps to circumvent risks of solipsism and projection
that dog many familiar approaches to others. However, it is less clear whether, as
a theory, Direct Perception can offer ways to avoid the structural encoding of
power dynamics that Marilyn Fry diagnosed as “arrogant perception.” Indeed,
there is a serious danger that Direct Perception, like many of its hermeneutically
oriented precursors, might be complicit in such power structures by squeezing out
the space for critical social inquiry that the gap between self and other ought to
foster.
Frye defined arrogant perception as a tendency of those in power to arrogate
others to serve their interests, not only in practice, but at the very level of
perception. The wrong perpetrated on arrogated others operates “invisibly”
precisely to the extent that these interests structure what can become visible at all,
while the structuring power itself remains invisible, operating “behind the scenes.”
Frye’s own prescription of “loving perception” is inadequate to address this
wrong for reasons that Direct Perception can help to articulate. Loving perception
makes demands on the individual intentional attitudes of the participating
subjects, but the true level of damage belongs to a space between such subjects,
one that structures their expressive and intentional possibilities, rather than vice

versa. Lugones notion of world-travelling does a better job addressing the depth
of the problem, since it acknowledges the power of the structuring in-betweens
and calls for their plurification. Still, her plea for “playfulness” remains vague. In
the final section of this paper, I argue that Direct Perception can learn from
Lugones’s move away from the hermeneutic framework of rule-governed play
and toward an ethos of playfulness. Meanwhile, Direct Perception’s attention to
interactive expressivism, with its debt to Merleau-Ponty’s intercorporeity, can help
to fill in what this playfulness might look like. What I call “critical intercorporeity”
allows us to explore how expressivity not only undergirds intelligibility, but might
disrupt it as well, plausibly and playfully taking aim at the arrogating, embedded
structures that govern visibility.

